Here, from a Substack post, is a summary of what 's been happening in Altadena since the disastrous Eaton Fire last January. In a nutshell, the County dropped the ball (several times), thereby alienating - and forfeiting the trust of -  the people of unincorporated Altadena. Rather than consider the residents' proposed solution, the County and its fellow travelers in the existing power base came up with their own "answer", which is a clone of the traditional approach - preserving the roles of the powerful without really accomplishing much. That's straight out of the Machiavelli playbook. Consider some of the political wisdom of Niccolò Machiavelli:

• Power is the pivot on which everything hinges. He who has the power is always right; the weaker is always wrong.
• It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who gain by the new ones.
• A wise ruler should rely on what is under his own control, not on what is under the control of others.

Altadena's situation pretty much mirrors how life happens  for the 5-6 million residents of urbanized, unincorporated communities in California. Since they do not have Mayors and City Councils, the people of unincorporated California have no choice but to rely on county Boards of Supervisors to handle municipal affairs. Yet, typically, county Supervisors are overwhelmed by the enormity of their areawide responsibilities and cannot focus on the minutiae of municipal duties - for example, potholes or even law enforcement. When something big happens, like a horrible fire, heroic leadership is demanded from the county. That greatly stresses the system, often forcing retreat into historically ineffective "tried and true" responses involving studies, commissions and time delays. Solutions that are outside the normal channels tend to be things those in power cannot control and are thus things to be resisted.

The post from @AltaPolicyWonk on Substack is reposted here with the consent of the author:

6 MONTHS LATER…

Six months ago, twin travesties fell on Los Angeles. In the morning of January 7, 2025, the winds began to rise. Winds in the city are not unusual, though they always cause concern. They are called “Devil Winds” for a reason. They are dry. They are swift. They are part of the natural ecology, but they nevertheless leave destruction in their wake. Los Angeles is accustomed to them. Residents know to expect them. Hurricane force however is not normal.

January 7 was different. Forecasters predicted the force of the winds. They were not unexpected, but the City and County were not prepared for. First went the Palisades in the morning. The media broadcast the familiar images of fires and houses at risk. Fire departments rushed to “mutually aid” those responding to the Palisades fires. Air cover were grounded because of the winds. It was going to be a ground-based approach to stopping the destruction. The winds were relentless. Homes were destroyed at a lighting quick pace. The winds continued to pick up during the day. Power was cut off in vulnerable areas, including Altadena, as a precautionary measure after previous fires in Paradise and Sonoma.

The fires continued to rage in the Palisades as the sun set on the city. Then there was the alleged spark on a transmission line decommissioned over fifty years ago. It began anew. Eaton Canyon, a large park on a mountainside in Altadena began to burn. The winds were relentless. The fire consumed all the fuel in Eaton Canyon and started up the mountainside. Darkness was pierced by the orange glow. Destruction was about to be visited to a second city.

When the smoke cleared, 18 people had lost their lives. About 66% of Altadena was lost. Whole sections of the city were burned to the ground with nothing standing. Other areas, there were one house among the ruins. Chimneys marked the remains. Devastation was visited on two separate parts of Los Angeles.

What is Altadena?

Altadena is a community of 40,000 residents north of Pasadena. The community is unincorporated, meaning the County of Los Angeles governs it. Besides East Los Angeles, Altadena is the second largest unincorporated community in Los Angeles County, among the 88 other separate cities.

Altadena was not originally viewed by Pasadena as worthy land to bring into its city limits. It was the “hunting grounds” of the Valley Hunt Club, the originator of the famous Rose Parade. There was a hotel at the top of Mount Lowe, which can be accessed by a trial at the top of Lake Avenue today. As a touch of irony, that hotel burned to the ground around the turn of the century.

Altadena is fiercely independent. The town developed over the first half of the 20th Century. Horses, homes, artists, and creatives make up the city. It remained unincorporated when Pasadena wanted to annex it over the years. As is widely known, as part of in the 1960s and 1970s, Altadena became home to many black homeowners who were “redlined” out of other communities, including Pasadena. The black population of Altadena has one of the highest home ownership rates in California if not the nation.

Altadena has been “gentrifying” in recent years, with new families finding the affordable homes, land, and access to mountains as an alternative to many other areas in the city. The character of the city however, with its quirks remain, as well as the deep sense of history and independence.

Elections Have Effects

When the fires hit, Altadena was at a unique point. The elections in November 2025 had changed the State leadership entirely. Altadena went from a district with 2 of the most powerful members of the legislature (Chairs of the Appropriations Committees in the Assembly and Senate) to two first time legislators. At the County, Altadena’s Supervisor was elected for her 3rd and final term. Nationally, Donald Trump had won not only the Presidency, but also the two houses of Congress would be Republican. For a majority democrat community in a solidly democrat state, the figurative winds were blowing against Altadena even after the actual ones had died down.

The Request

When the fires had subsided, the Biden Administration did not hesitate in its final days to authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to deploy all the resources it could to assist the aftermath in both Altadena and the Palisades. The National Guard was called in to assist state and local law enforcement to protect homes from looters. Army Corps of Engineers were called in to begin assisting in assessing the recovery. As has been the custom since Hurricane Andrew, the State began to compile its request for follow on money, something called the Community Development Block Grant- Disaster Request (CDBG-DR), which would ultimately total $39 billion. Congress initially said “no money to California.” Things would be different this time. Was it negotiation or was it real? Biden could not push through such a request as it was too quick and the numbers not finalized from the State. The request would fall to the new Trump Administration. The early signs of something different being in the air was there. Again, another warning sign missed like the wind predictions on January 7.

Word was from Washington was this time “it” was going to be different. The “profitability of disasters” would not be repeated. The fact these disasters fell on California was doubly unfortunate. California’s congressional delegation had much less power than in previous administrations and congresses. It was going to be an uphill battle to get to that $39 billion. Meanwhile, people on the ground were wondering what would happen? The State had no money. Federals were saying no. Someone would solve the riddle it was felt. Many were too shocked to even begin to register the second storm gathering. Altadena’s independence was about to challenged again.

Early Discussions and Recognizing There Was a Problem

In light of the changes in Washington, discussions were being had about what to do among the disaster victims. Ideas about a catalog of homes were being casted about (Foothill Catalog Foundation). Government was focused on the “stabilization.” The media were carrying stories about people losing everything. People were devastated. Shock permeated. The community did not know what to do. Elected officials were overwhelmed. Clarity was missing. Washington was working to help get “Altadena back on its feet,” but nobody knew what a rebuild would look like.

Early probes by certain members of the community were sent to State officials about a new way to bring in the money in the days following the fire. People needed stability. Insurance was going to cover a part of the rebuild, but there were people who did not have insurance. In many cases, those uninsured had their entire generational wealth tied up in the home. What was going to happen to those families? We needed to “stabilize” the community. People needed to have a hand to help them know there were options in this time. The Community Stabilization Act, AB 797 was born in these times. AB 797 is a bill which uses money from certain banks they are required to use for compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The money could be used, through a mechanism in the bill, to purchase land at “fair market value.” In other words, the goal was to combat those articles about predatory acquisitions of land by ensuring there was an actual bid to establish a floor for those homeowners, if they chose to sell. Could the bill be fast tracked? No, but the governor did issue a moratorium on below market “bids” for homes a week after the fires. At least something was beginning to be done. These efforts were from the community. Altadena’s independence was shining through.

Still, the Federal Government communicating it was not going to come in with money at the time (nor have they today), so looking over the horizon, the goal was to have something in place to give the community comfort. At this point, with the moratorium in place, maybe the community could get the full bill (AB 797) included in the initial package of fire relief approved by the Assembly and signed by the governor, but that goal was not to be. Altadena would have to wait. Waiting is painful. Waiting was unnecessary. Waiting hurt residents. Waiting compounded the problems.

Discomfort, Delay, Distrust

Over at the City of Los Angeles, they appointed a “czar,” Steve Soboroff, who was tasked with coordinating the City’s response to the fire and report on April 11 the results of his findings. The County did not appoint anyone. As the media carried stories of the devastation, which all major outlets broadcast, nothing was happening on the ground. Shock was giving way to anger and confusion. A void was created. Anger over why. Why did it happen? Why did people not protect residents? Why is there no plan to do something once the fire happened? Why were Altadena residents being exposed? Something did not add up. Where were the answers? Trust was lost.

One of the first signs of the way things were going to be handled was the consolidated waste and sorting facility at the Altadena Golf Course. Trust was being lost by the day. What could have been stabilizing further denigrated the standing of those in decision making authority.

When the “debris removal” plans were set, there were two paths residents could take. The first was the Army Corps of Engineers, which the vast majority of residents would ultimately use. The Army would come in and clear the lot on behalf of the County. Then the County would bill your insurance for the amount if you had insurance. If not, the service was free. Second, if you did not want to wait for the County, you could obtain a permit to have your house debris removed by a private company.

Initially, the Army, along with the County, were looking for a facility to centrally “sort” the debris from the homes. It was going to take a year according to early estimates. The debris was filled with toxins, including lead and asbestos. Private contractors would have to “sort” the debris onsite before loading and transporting the load to the proper disposal facilities. The Army (and County), however, had a different approach. The County and the Army signed a contract for the use of the Altadena Golf Course to be a sorting facility for all debris from homes and centrally handled and shipped out. The contract was not public, nor were the terms. Toxic debris would be handled at the Golf Course, in a residential area where people lived. The plan, furthermore, meant the Army would handle toxic debris not once, like the private contractors, but twice, once at the initial residential site and then sort it at a second site, doubling the potential of released toxic dust into the air. Compounding the problem was the areas surrounding the Golf Course and downwind were areas people were moving back into or were survivors of the fire.

Instead of creating trust at a vulnerable time, the County did the opposite. Protests occurred. Electeds threw up their hands. They ignored the pleas of residents. The County, FEMA, and the Army played “point the finger at the other.” They all “understood the concerns of residents,” but, “the decision was being made by someone else.” Residents were left fuming over more disappointment, more confusion, more anger. Lawsuits were contemplated to at least delay the use of the Golf Course as envisioned, forcing decisions. Phone calls were placed to Washington. Suddenly a change occurred. The Army would follow the same procedures the private contractors would. The damage was done. Dark of night, back room deals dealt a blow of trust against the County when it was needed to be the other way. Those who know the story know it was yet another brick in the wall.

Lack of Plans and a Void

Since the fires, residents have been more and more frustrated. No plans for rebuilds have been publicly proposed. Groups have been formed. Groups of residents providing feedback. Groups from inside and outside of Altadena trying to “assist.” Noise and “static” has reached a high point. Ideas of solutions looking for problems have been everywhere. $10 billion or more as a disaster is going to attract a lot of attention in a County where a $100 million project is considered large. There is no shortage of groups wanting to get theirs. The usual groups involved in LA Politics, newbies from out of State, and the many different groups in between all want theirs and were solicited. What was in short supply was the Plan. How were we going to rebuild?

In February, a local nonprofit (full disclosure, mine), published a plan to start outlining an approach to addressing the rebuild in the void left of 6 weeks and no plan. The goal was to “jump start” the conversation. The approach was picked up by RealClearPolitics and published nationally. The goal was to start to guide groups looking at the rebuild to argue about something tangible instead of nothing.

February gave way to March. The Urban Land Institute was beginning to finalize its report. Mid-March brought a Wall Street Journal article ostensibly about the insurance problem in California, but buried in the article was the lede discussing a few names and an approach to the rebuild. It was the trial balloon. Would large organizations get to control the project? It was another warning. It showed big names, big money, and a “top down” approach. The report focused on the Palisades, but the shot across the bow was clear. Altadena had to figure something out and without the guidance or leadership, being distracted by groups, surveys, and just the anguish of recovering. Disasters create opportunities for those without the best interests of the community in mind.

The “official’ push was going to be around Climate Resilience Districts (CRD)s and Tax Increment Financing. These concepts were being discussed in multiple conferences as the big push, especially “when” the “federal money would finally happen.” Interests lined up behind the approach, interests which control politics in Los Angeles.

The concept is simple for TIFs. You borrow from Peter to pay Paul. As the land values go up in a certain district, so do the taxes. Therefore, you borrow against a portion of those increased taxes of tomorrow to pay for a project today, in the case of CRDs, making an area “climate hardened” for climate change, though the money is used for whatever building you want because everything is climate-related in the concept. SB 782 was introduced in February to implement the plan. It was supported by the County. The bill would implement “emergency authority” to get the districts stood up without residential input or votes. The County did it to its residents in Altadena again. The listening, the plans, the groups did not matter other than they could support what the County wanted. The pieces were starting to move against the community again. Challenges came from all sides.

The Blue Ribbon Commission

In late March, the Urban Land Institute’s report was published. It outlined the challenges to rebuilding. The usual discussion about expediting permits, codes, logistic challenges, et cetera were discussed. Two big holes existed however. There was the question of how will insurance be issued in light of these fires and the challenging insurance market. The second question was how will the project be paid for in light of the fact the federal government was not going to pay for CDBG-DR money? Where will the money come from? The answer was already available in January with AB 797 and the Community Reinvestment Act but the answer was ignored. Some of us knew it, and a Substack was created the end of March to begin educating the community of the need to have solutions in place.

The Urban Land Institute questions were left unanswered as Soboroff issued his report on April 11. The report echoed the Urban Land Institute’s report. The County would not be outdone however. They formed a Blue Ribbon Commission. The next Commission wanted to explore these questions and more. They followed the Committee for Greater LA’s model around housing and homelessness. The Blue Ribbon Commission “polled” residents of Altadena and the Palisades. They wanted to know what to do, while knowing exactly what they were going to do. They wanted to hear what the residents thought, but in reality, they wanted to shape what the residents thought.

The Blue Ribbon Commission published its report in May. There were no answers about “how,” rather, the report echoed the challenges of the Urban Land Institute report with more discussion on the hardening and need for climate resilience. Left unanswered was how was Los Angeles going to pay for the rebuild without federal money? The crux of the report is the creation of a Redevelopment Authority, vesting extraordinary powers with the County, similar to what was created in the wake of the housing situation with the Los Angeles County Affordable Housing Solutions Authority (LACHASA). Homelessness had been the solution done before, so why not follow the same approach? The political world likes to do what has been done before, whether it is right or not, and whether it is effective or not. Interests are lined up around the solution so that works, even though “history does not repeat itself, but it sure does rhyme,” in other words, while similar, they are not the same and require different solutions.

The Bifurcation

As of today, Los Angeles’s approach to the fire’s next stage is bifurcating- moving in two directions. There is officialdom focused on top down solutions. There is a desire to bring in authorities and special districts to impose on residents new solutions to rebuild and also align interests around those approaches.

Altadena residents in particular are tremendously frustrated with the official response and a lack of trust and transparency, as has been evidenced by the Golf Course, the Contracting Process, the Commissions, and the overall response to the fire since day one when efforts could have been put into solutions readily available.

The bottom up approach is the other side of the bifurcation. People want to have a say in their rebuild. They do not want it imposed. They want to voice their opinion of what their neighborhood will look like. Of course, bottom up is complicated.

You can see the approaches through the two camps in the two major bills being considered right now in the Legislature. SB 782, which creates Climate Resilience Districts, is imposed from atop. If the bill passes, the City or County can create the district without the input of residents. Residents do not get a vote either on the use of their tax dollars. The protest vote parameters were removed by the bill. The decisions are made by appointees and that is it. The same with the Rebuilding Authority the Blue Ribbon Commission is suggesting. The question of whether the Authority would have to be voted on by a County-wide ballot measure remains to be seen, but less input is better for the purposes of these approaches.

The other approach can be seen in AB 797. That bill allows for the purchase of land through community nonprofits. There is no one single authority. The State allocates the funds to a group of nonprofits accountable to the community. The land purchased with the funds and the land is held in trust and then sold to the market or developed with community input. The money is used to provide resident land holders an option, a choice. The model can be applied to the other policy needs which Altadena, the Palisades, and beyond will need.

Both approaches are on display for what will be the future of disaster responses in California, and the choice will have long-term effects on not only the Los Angeles County communities, but much further beyond.

Where We Stand Today

The lots are being cleared at a phenomenal pace. Most residential lots are ready to begin building. Residents are making choices, submitting permits, and deciding what those next steps are. Do they want to rebuild? Do they want to leave? What will each look like? Where is the information to make those choices now that the Army has done its job? The County has provided no guidance. People are making choices without the full information. There are options, but the delays have distracted the solutions. Delays are affecting people, those most vulnerable in fact.

For instance, is there a way to finance Low to Moderate Income (LMI) homes? Yes. If you want to rebuild, there is a path to get there and be less than what it would cost to rent a two bedroom apartment. What about those with gaps in their insurance to what the rebuild would cost? Yes, there are ways that goal can be accomplished. Utilities being recapitalized? There are sources of funds too. What about rebuilding small businesses and commercial corridors? Yes, there is a way there for Altadena. In other words, where are these concepts being discussed? The focus is on authorities and districts.

The frustration with the pace of the rebuild is the fact there are ways there. When the fires hit, Altadena was fiercely independent. The challenges are not because Los Angeles is so difficult to govern. The challenges are beyond that. The answers are there. The rebuild is captivating because it is a microcosm of Los Angeles and all its good and bad. There are so many threads to the story. The human interest, the power dynamics, the lack of accountability to the residents. The challenges are different than before. The rules are being rewritten in real time. There are people looking at these changes and answers exist. Altadena will have to fight for what is its. Altadena will have to fight off those who do not want to do it differently. Hope is not all lost but these disasters are huge. The story will play out. This is Chapter 1.