The article below was posted at CalMatters on 09/16/2026. The author has given us permission to republish it here, and CalMatters encourages republishing. We are grateful to both Mr. Thomas and CalMatters for graciously providing this content. The article, and the ARISE study it mentions, speak to the unfair treatment of Altadena during and following the Eaton Fire. Sadly, that's not news to the people of Altadena. Though we have brought Altadena's problems up before, this article has some specific data that people in the Capitol need to hear about. The new year will bring a new Administration to Sacramento and new faces to the Capitol. We are hopeful that the plight of California's unincorporated communities will get some attention for a change. In that regard, we present this Commentary from CalMatters:

Did Altadena’s unincorporated status play a role in safety lapses during the Eaton Fire? - Aimery Thomas September 16, 2026

After an 18-month investigation, Los Angeles County concluded that Southern California Edison equipment ignited the Eaton Fire, last year. At least 19 people died; 9,419 structures were destroyed, and an entire community was devastated. 

The report answers how the fire started but not a more consequential question: Who in government is fully accountable to Altadena?

The county’s findings don’t explain why residents received so little disaster preparedness or outreach, why warnings failed to reach many before the fire reached their homes, how county public safety resources were allocated during the first 24 hours, or why protective systems were constrained by outdated policies, unclear authority, staffing shortages and incompatible communications.

Most Californians experience county government alongside city government. In Altadena, Los Angeles County is the default government. 

Altadena’s elected town council has no municipal authority and only advises the county. The County Board of Supervisors serves as an ersatz city council, and a supervisor functions — in the county’s own description — as the “mayor” for dozens of communities.

Altadena is not some small settlement. Before the fire, it had nearly 43,000 residents across more than 8.4 square miles. Compared with Los Angeles County’s other cities, Altadena was more populous than 47 and larger than 53 of them. 

et responsibility for servicing it is dispersed across many county agencies, including the Fire Department, Sheriff’s Department, Office of Emergency Management, Public Works, Chief Executive Office and a supervisorial office. 

Such dispersion obscures accountability after disasters. If gaps of service failures exist, governing boards, executives and elected officials should be accountable for understanding and owning them.

I came to this issue as a public policy researcher and an Eaton Fire survivor. My family and I evacuated, sustained damage to our home and business and spent weeks coordinating aid and listening to survivors. 

Our firm conducted the pro bono ARISE study of 1,228 Altadenans. We found roughly 3 in 4 households reported receiving no county fire preparedness outreach during the year before the fire. And less than 8% of evacuees reported seeing firefighters while evacuating. 

These self-reported experiences show how distant county service delivery appeared to be before and during the crisis.

The county’s after-action review identified outdated and inconsistent policies, ambiguity around authority, staffing and resource shortages, inadequate training and situational awareness, and communications gaps. But the review was not intended to investigate wrongdoing or assign blame. 

Its finding that there was “no single point of failure” shouldn’t be mistaken for a finding that the government didn’t fail. This offers survivors little comfort or clarity as they navigate rebuilding decisions.

Accountability is not a zero-sum exercise. Edison’s responsibility for ignition doesn’t erase county responsibility for preparedness, warnings, evacuation, response and recovery. 

Holding Los Angeles County accountable doesn’t require denying that there were extraordinary weather conditions. It doesn’t require second-guessing frontline decisions made under impossible conditions. 

It does require determining whether agencies were prepared, properly led and capable of providing services residents paid for through taxation — but without the municipal representation available in incorporated cities. 

The state auditor is examining prevention and response to the Eaton and Palisades fires, while the attorney general is investigating potential civil rights violations. 

The Legislature’s Joint Legislative Audit Committee should direct a broader inquiry into county spending and service quality in Altadena before, during, and after the fire. 

It should compare preparedness, warnings, staffing, deployment and emergency response with incorporated cities of similar population, land area, and wildfire risk using expenditure records, dispatch data, internal communications and resident testimony — to determine whether Altadena’s unincorporated status produced gaps in service or accountability.

Altadenans are owed an apology and a candid accounting from Los Angeles County, which should disclose all evidence it can lawfully release, directly acknowledging where its systems failed and explaining how harm will be repaired. 

Residents of unincorporated communities like Altadena should never again have to infer from organizational charts, reports or county hazard mitigation plans who is responsible for their safety.

Guest Commentary written by

Aimery Thomas

Aimery Thomas is a public policy researcher, managing director of The Future Organization and a doctoral student at Claremont Graduate University.